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The Predicament of the Immigrant
Victim/Defendant:
"VAW A Diversion" and Other Considerations in
Support of Battered Women
Zelda B. Harris •
The struggle to combat domestic violence has sustained a modem
feminist movement that began over thirty years ago. The push to prioritize
domestic violence on the feminist agenda has yielded far-reaching and
tangible results in a relatively short period. The passage of the Violence
Against Women Act of 1994 (V A WA) 1 and the Battered Immigrant
Women Protection Act of 2000 (VA WA' IIi is a testament to this fact.
VA WA and VA WAil are a culmination of efforts and collaborations made
between and across members of the feminist and civil rights movement.
However, as the fanfare over the collective rewards fades, serious concerns
remain concerning the impact of the policies and laws on non-white women
who have been subjected to historical oppression based on race or national
origin. Unfortunately, poor women of color have been left to bear the
expense and debts owed from waging a war against gender inequality.3
One example of the damage is the effect of mandatory misdemeanor
domestic violence prosecution policies on women who have immigrated to
• Clinical Professor of Law and Director of the Domestic Violence Law Clinic, The
University of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law. B.S. 1988, Syracuse University;
J.D. 1991, Washington University School of Law. The author wishes to thank all of the
students who have spent tireless, dedicated hours providing quality representation to victims
of domestic violence in Southern Arizona. The author wishes to extend particular gratitude
to the following students and colleagues that found time to assist with research in this area:
Mary Day, Bertha Fresquez, Pete Gutierrez, Valerie Hink, Lynn Marcus, and Andrea
Montavan Mc-Killip.
1. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit.
IV, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
2. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, tit.
V, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7110).
3. See generally Jenny Rivera, The Violence Against Women Act and the Construction
of Multiple Consciousness in the Civil Rights and Feminist Movements, 4 J.L. & POL'y 463
(1996) (providing a detailed discussion .of the often conflicting interests of the feminist
movement and the civil rights movement with respect to the Violence Against Women Act).
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the United States with abusive U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident
spouses. 4 The mandatory policies, lobbied for by anti-domestic violence
advocates, have effectively disabled immigrant women from securing the
personal freedom needed to gain the very safety for themselves and their
children that the movement promised. s
The following essay seeks to shed light on some of the unintended
consequences of mandatory prosecution policies as gleaned from my
experience representing battered women in the Domestic Violence Law
Clinic in Tucson, Arizona. 6 Tucson is located in close proximity to the
border of Mexico. Consequently, many of the clients served by the Clinic
are recent immigrants from Mexico and other Latin American countries?
Any interaction with the criminal justice system can have permanent
consequences for immigrants seeking citizenship in this country.s The
current domestic violence laws and policies, in an effi)rt to effectuate colorand gender-blind justice, treat the female immigrant defendant the same as
the male, non-immigrant defendant.
The imposition of mandatory
prosecution policies on battered immigrant women who find themselves
defendants in criminal court has overly harsh and unwarranted results. The
typical criminal defendant represented by the Clinic is a poor, recently
immigrated, non-English speaking woman with children. That typical
client is a survivor of domestic violence at the hands of the person who
stands as a "victim" in criminal court.
The following article examines a representative case involving a
4. See Cecilia M. Espenoza, No Relief of the Weary: VA WA Relief Denied for Battered
Immigrants Lost in the Intersections, 83 MARQ. L. REv. 163, 185-86 (1999) (arguing that
VAWA encourages mandatory arrest practices and the arrest of the primary aggressor,
which often results in the arrest of the immigrant woman due to police bias).
5. See id. at 188-89.
6. The Domestic Violence Law Clinic [hereinafter Clinic] is a teaching law office,
staffed primarily by senior law students who are supervised by the Clinic Director. The
Clinic is part of the clinical course curriculum at The University of Arizona, James E.
Rogers College of Law in Tucson, Arizona. The Clinic provides direct legal representation
and advice to victims of domestic violence in southern Arizona in collaboration with
Southern Arizona Legal Aid, Inc. (the local civil legal service provider) and anti-domestic
violence victim advocacy and shelter service providers in the community. Initial client
interviews are conducted on-site at battered women's shelters. The clients are pre-screened
by shelter advocates to mcet baseline eligibility requirements for domestic violence services.
In 1998, when I began my work as the director of the Clinic, I expected that the great
majority of clients interviewed and provided with legal representation would be women
seeking various forms of eivil relief from the eourt. While this expectation has held true, an
unexpected observation emerged. The Clinie provided a notable amount of services to
women who had been charged with criminal aets of misdemeanor domestic violenee.
Conversely, the same women had been identified by shelter advocates as victims of
domestic violence, not perpetrators.
7. See generally Tuscon Planning Deptartment, Pima County/Tucson Race and Ethnicity
Comparisons Report (2000), available at http://www.ci.tucson.az.us/pianning. The most
recent census for the area reports that over 35% of the population in the City of Tucson is
Hispanic. Id.
8. Espenoza, supra note 4, at 176.
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battered immigrant woman facing prosecution for a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence. Sections II and III examine the debate regarding
mandatory state intervention in violent relationships. Sections IV and V
provide an overview of the current domestic violence laws and policies in
place in Arizona and an examination of the application of the various
policies to the representative case. Section VI analyzes the typical
responses of battered immigrant women to an incident of violence. Section
VII examines the consequences of an arrest for misdemeanor domestic
violence for a battered immigrant woman. Finally, this article calls for the
use of a strategy referred to as "VAWA diversion,,9 in misdemeanor cases
of domestic violence involving battered immigrant women as defendants.

1. ROSA'S PROFILE: A CASE ILLUSTRATION1o
Rosa, age twenty-two, was born in the city of Sonora, Mexico. Prior to
her arrival in Tucson, Rosa resided in a small bungalow-style home with
her mother, two of her brothers, and the brothers' wives and children. Rosa
completed six years of formal education in Mexico, spoke Spanish only,
and worked primarily as a domestic worker for some of the wealthier
families in her community. She had never been married and had no
children before coming to the United States.
Rosa met Francisco, forty-one, three years ago when he was visiting
friends in Sonora. Francisco had been married and divorced twice, but he
had no children. He held dual citizenship in the U.S. and Mexico.
Francisco easily convinced Rosa to leave the security of her family and all
that was familiar to her to live with him in the U.S. Francisco had a job
and a single-family home in Tucson. Rosa and Francisco were married in a
religious and civil ceremony in Mexico. Despite her reluctance to leave her
family, Francisco assured Rosa that he would help her acquire U.S.
citizenship, allowing her to travel freely to and from Mexico.
Within the first two years of her arrival in Tucson, Rosa gave birth to
two children. Francisco had either intentionally refused or neglected to file
the requisite documents with the Immigration and Naturalization Service
that would provide Rosa with a form of legal status in this country. When
Rosa questioned Francisco about his lack of efforts to secure her legal
status, he insisted that if she worked harder in the home and stopped being
so concerned with learning to speak English, socializing with women in the
neighborhood, or dressing, acting, and talking like an American, then
maybe they could succeed in this country. Believing in the dream, Rosa
9. VA WA diversion is a term this author first heard used by court advocates working at
The Brewster Center Domestic Violence Services, Inc. in Tucson, Arizona. The concept is
explained further at infra text accompanying note 135.
10. Rosa's case is a hypothetical based on my experiences in the Clinic representing
immigrant victims of domestic violence charged with acts of misdemeanor domestic
violence in southern Arizona.
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retreated.
Domestic violence does not interrupt a relationship suddenly like an
uninvited guest. Instead, it is a disease that grows steadily and consistently
throughout our communities. It is regularly nurtured by racial and cultural
oppression, misogyny, homophobia, and socially condoned violence in our.
community. II The pressures visited upon the newly immigrated family,
including pressure to conform and assimilate while holding true to cultural
traditions, can be overwhelming. Although this stress is not an excuse or
justification for domestic violence, it must be understood as the context in
which violence occurs.

II. THE PUSH FOR MANDATORY INTERVENTION TO
COMBAT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Historically, violence in the horne has been hidden from public view
due to societal resistance, supported by law, against intrusion into the
sphere of family privacy.12 Advocates working in the anti-domestic
violence movement viewed transferring domestic violence from a private
concern to a public responsibility as central to systemic reform. 13 The
creation of laws and policies to combat domestic violence could not have
developed without public acceptance that domestic violence is a societal
problem that affects the community at large.
Mandatory policies were sought to address two prevailing difficulties
in combating domestic violence; 1) coercive control tactics used by the
abuser to prevent the victim from seeking assistance, and 2) resistance by
state actors l4 to intervene. IS Laws requiring mandatory intervention, in
theory, would diminish the abusers' control over the victim by taking the
decision to intervene out of the hands of the victim and placing that power
in the hands of the state. Accordingly, no amount of coercion directed
11. See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN & ROXANNE MYKITIUK, THE PUBLIC
NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE (1994) (providing an exceptional compilation of feminist
writings addressing domestic violence).
12. See id. at xiii. The parameters of the family institution "traditionally set aside as
paradigmatically 'private' have historically defined a more or less bright line across which
state or 'public' intervention and regulation are considered problematic." [d.
13. See Donna Wills, Domestic Violence: The Case Jor Aggressive Prosecution, 7 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 173, 173-74 (1997) (arguing in favor of aggressive prosecution because
domestic violence is a public safety issue, domestic violence victims cannot be relied upon
to appropriately vindicate the state's interest in holding batterers responsible for their
violence, and because prosecutor intervention is necessary to prevent further batterer
intimidation and coercion).
14. By "state actors" I mean those persons and institutions in positions of legal authority
that are required, by law, to respond to domestic violence. These individuals include law
enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges.
IS. See generally Wills, supra note 13 (analyzing the arguments in favor of mandatory
prosecution policies); Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law oj Misdemeanor Domestic Violence,
1970·1990,83 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46 (1992) (providing a historical account of the
development of misdemeanor domestic violence policies).
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against the victim could prevent the state from seeking punishment of the
abuser for his criminal conduct.
Similarly, it was commonly viewed that resistance by law enforcement
officers to make arrests and prosecutors to pursue charges was tied to the
victim's lack of cooperation in the process, most likely due to the abuser's
coercion. 16 Additionally, lack of arrest and prosecution was tied to
personal biases of individual state actors resulting in institutional gender
biasY Again, mandatory policies were seen as a measure to ensure
punishment of the offender despite his attempts to exert control over the
victim or resistance by state actors to take action against the abuser. 18
Ultimately, it can be argued that mandatory intervention policies have
effectively removed the shield of privacy covering domestic violence.
Domestic violence is now viewed· as a legitimate and serious public
problem. 19 State laws and policies have clearly defined a level of conduct
and behavior in intimate relationships that will not be tolerated. Finally the
abuser's ability to control the outcome of state intervention has been
curtailed as decision-making power has been transferred from the
individual victim to the state. 20

III. RESPONSES IN OPPOSITION TO MANDATORY
INTERVENTION POLICIES
Despite general agreement by advocates in the anti-domestic violence
movement that family violence issues should be viewed as a public
concern, there is disagreement over how such public intervention should
occur. 21 Responses in opposition to mandatory intervention fall under two
central themes. First, victim self-determination and trust in her decisionmaking abilities are not recognized under a mandatory intervention
scheme. 22 Second, the mandatory policies harm minority communities that
16. Wills, supra note 13, at 179-80.
17. Espenoza, supra note 4; at 186.
18. Wills, supra note 13, at 180.
19. Cf American Bar Association Commission on Domestic Violence, Organization
Resource Information, at http://www.abanet.orgldomvioVresourceinformation.html(last
visited May 1, 2003) (listing state-wide domestic violence coalitions in all 50 states, Puerto
Rico, and the Virgin Islands).
20. Wills, supra note 13, at 180.
21. Compare Linda O. Mills, Mills on Mandates, Reel Two, 6 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REP.
17 (2001), and Linda O. Mills, The Case Against Mandatory State Interventions: A Reply to
Evan Stark, 5 DoMESTIC VIOLENCE REP. I (2000) [hereinafter Mills, Reply to Evan Stark],
and Linda O. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State
Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 551 (\999) [hereinafter Mills, Killing Her Softly] (arguing
that mandatory intervention needs to be reconsidered and that battered women are safest
when they are given the choice as to whether or not to prosecute their batterer), with Evan
Stark, Do Mandated State Interventions Contribute to Woman Battering?, 5 DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE REp. 65 (2000) (criticizing Mill's arguments against mandatory state intervention
as lacking evidential support).
22. Mills, Reply to Evan Stark, supra note 21, at 14.
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have suffered historical oppression based on race and national origin to the
detriment of both abuser and victim. 23
First, with regard to victim self-determination, mandatory policies
admittedly move the decision to take action against the abuser from the
victim to the state. However, to the extent that these policies were
constructed in response to perceived coercive control tactics utilized by the
abuser over the victim, the policies fail to acknowledge other reasons for
the victim's reluctance to participate in the process. Particularly, it has
been asserted that victims do not seek state intervention due to their
mistrust in the system. 24 Victim lack of confidence in state intervention is
rational given that traditional methods of addressing domestic violence (i.e.
mediation, cite and release, delayi 5 may have led to increased risk of
violence to the victim. 26 Critics of mandatory intervention argue that the
policies do not defer to the victim when pursuing punishment against the
abuser that will have consequences for the victim and her family.27 For
example, policies resulting in the abuser having a criminal record of arrest
and conviction may have a direct impact on his ability to secure
employment and provide support for the victim and her children. Further,
it has been argued that mandatory policies entrench negative stereotypes of
women and their ability to make rational decisions concerning family
violence. 28 On the one hand, mandatory intervention is seen as necessary
to address the problem of women dropping charges because of coercion by
the abuser. 29 On the other hand, the policies may be overly controlling by
dictating a certain outcome without regard to the legitimate reasons women
have for not seeking relief through the criminal justice system. 30
Second, there are concerns about the impact of mandatory prosecution
policies on communities of racial and ethnic minorities that have suffered
historical oppression through the operation of discriminatory laws and

23. See generally Mills, Killing Her Softly, supra note 21, at 550 (providing extentsive
treatment of the arguments against mandatory prosecution); Linda G. Mills, Intuition and
Insight: A New Job Description for the Battered Woman's Prosecutor and Other More
Modest Proposals. 7 UCLA WOMEN'S LJ. 183 (1997) [hereinafter Mills, Intuition and
Insight] (same); Linda G. Mills, On the Other Side of Silence: Affective lJawyering for
Intimate Abuse, 81 CORNELL L REv. 1225 (1996) [hereinafter Mills, Affective Lawyering]
(same).
24. See Mills, Affective Lawyering, supra note 23, at 1226-27 (noting that only 14% of
women who are severely abused ever call the police).
25. Zorza, supra note IS, at 47-48.
26. See id. at 50.
27. See Mills, Intuition and Insight, supra note 23, at 184 (explaining that minority
women in particular may be ostracized by their community and family for reporting
domestic violence).
28. Id.
29. Wills, supra note 13, at 181-82.
30. See Mills, Intuition and Insight, supra note 23, at 184-85 (noting various reasons why
a woman may choose not to prosecute her abuser beyond coercion).
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policies. 3 ) Although mandatory intervention policies are facially nondiscriminatory, it can be argued that the policies, to the extent that they are
based on a criminal justice model, have a greater impact on members of
minority communities. 32 Addressing racially discriminatory practices by
state actors has long been on the agenda of civil rights organizations. 33
Accordingly, reliance on a criminal justice model to address domestic
violence does not recognize the oppression faced by minority communities
that include not only abusers, but victims and their children as weU?4
Mandatory policies do not take into account the reluctance of minority
women to trust that the criminal justice system will mete out justice in a
fashion that is both fair and juSt,35

IV. THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN
ARIZONA
The determination of whether a particular crime will be labeled an act
of domestic violence depends on the relationship between the victim and
offender. The Arizona Criminal Code lists some eighteen separate offenses
that can be classified as acts of domestic violence. 36 The crimes include

31. See Zan ita E. Fenton, Domestic Violence in Black and White: Racialized Gender
Stereotypes in Gender Violence, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1,49-50 (1998).
32. See Mills, Reply to Evan Stark, supra note 21, at 2, 14.
33. See Rivera, supra note 3, at 506 (arguing that mandatory prosecution furthers the
invasive state law model, which has proved "debilitating for communities of color and
women").
34. See Fenton, supra note 31, at 49.
35. See id. at 51-54 (explaining that minority communities embrace a general distrust for
the justice system).
36. ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 13-3601 (2003).
"Domestic violence" means any act which is a dangerous crime against
children as defined in § 13-604.01 or an offense defined in § 13-1201
through 13-1204, 13-1302 through 13-1304, 13-1502 through 13-1504 or
13-1602, § 13-2810, § 13-2904, subsection A, paragraph 1,2,3, or 6, § 132916 or § 13-2921, 13-2921.01, 13-2923, 13-3019, 13-3601.02 or 13-3623,
if any ofthe following applies:
1. The relationship between the victim and the defendant is one of
marriage or former marriage or of persons residing or having resided
in the same household.
2. The victim and the defendant have a child in common.
3. The victim or the defendant is pregnant by the other party.
4. The victim is related to the defendant or the defendant's spouse
by blood or court order as a parent, grandparent, child, grandchild,
brother or sister or by marriage as a parent-in-law, grandparent-inlaw, stepparent, step-grandparent, stepchild, step-grandchild,
brother-in-law or sister-in-law.
5. The victim is a child who resides or has resided in the same
household as the defendant and is related by blood to a former
spouse of the defendant or to a person who resides or who has
resided in the same household as the defendant.
ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 13-3601 (A) (2003).
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assault and aggravated assault,37 harassment and aggravated harassment,38
stalking,39 threatening and intimidating,40 using the telephone to harass,41
disorderly conduct,42 kidnapping,43 unlawful imprisonment,44 trespass,45
criminal damage,46 endangerment,47 dangerous crimes against children,48
custodial interference,49 child abuse, 50 and interfering with judicial
proceedings. 51 In addition, contributing to the delinquency or dependency
of a minor is a crime frequently charged in connection with acts of
domestic violence that occur in the presence of children. 52

V. MANDATORY INTERVENTION LAWS AND. POLICIES IN
PLACE IN ARIZONA
The following section outlines the mandatory intervention laws and
policies in place in Arizona concerning domestic violence in the areas of
reporting, arrest, prosecution, and sentencing.
A.

REpORTING

The reporting of all acts of domestic violence committed against an
adult victim is not specifically mandated by Arizona law. Instead,
physicians are under a legal obligation to report to law enforcement any
"material injury" that appears to be the result of an unlawful act. 53
Therefore, only adult domestic violence victims who are present at a
hospital or emergency room with serious physical injuries and are willing
to disclose the origin of their injuries are likely to have their cases reported
to law enforcement by a physician. As the majority of domestic violence
incidents do not involve serious physical injury,54 it is safe to assume that
·37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. §§ 13·1203 to 13·1204.
Id. §§ 13-2921 to 13·2921.0l.
/d. § 13-2923.
/d.§13-1202.
/d. § 13-2916.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-2904 (2003).
Id. § 13-1304.
/d. § 13-1303.
Id. §§ 13-1502 to 13-1504.
Id. § 13-1602.
Id. § 13-1201.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-604.01 (2003).
49. Id. § 13·1302.
50. /d. §§ 8·201,13-3623.
51. Id. § 13-2810.
52. Id. § 13-3612.
53. See id. § 13-3806.
54. U.S. Department of Justice, Violence Against Women: A National Victimization
Survey Report, NCJ-145325, at 8 (Jan. 1994). Table 14 of the study reports that 34% of
single-offender violent crime victimizations of women involved injury, but only 3% could
be classified as serious (gunshots or knife wounds, broken bones, loss of teeth, internal
injuries, loss of consciousness, and undetermined injuries requiring two or more· days of
hospitalization). /d.
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most cases of domestic violence observed by physicians and hospital staff
are not reported to law enforcement. However, in the service area of the
Clinic, many health care facilities have adopted a universal domestic
violence screening protocol for female patients. 55 Women who are not
suffering a material injury, but disclose the existence of domestic violence
during the screening process, are referred to professionals within the
institution or the larger community who are experienced in the field of
domestic violence. 56 Attempts have been made by anti-domestic violence
advocates to secure the enactment of mandatory domestic violence
reporting legislation, but the attempts have not yielded results to date. 57
B. ARREST

Mandatory arrest of domestic vi9lence offenders is required in Arizona
where probable cause exists to believe that a victim has been physically
injured and/or a weapon is found on the scene. 58 Further, law enforcement
officers have discretion to make an arrest without a warrant whenever they
believe proba1;>le cause exists to support any act of domestic violence. 59
Police officers are not required to delay taking action by seeking a warrant.
Also, officers do not have to personally observe the incident in .order to
affect an arrest without a warrant. The Arizona law in this regard is in line
with national trends to treat domestic violence as a crime to be addressed
rigorously through the criminal justice system, instead of mediated through
temporary separation of the parties. 60 It is the routine practice of law
enforcement agencies in Tucson to make arrests without warrants where
they possess probable cause to believe an incident of domestic violence has
occurred. 61 However, state and local advocates have raised concern over
implementation of the mandatory arrest laws. 62
Additionally, the law mandates that police :officers take domestic
55. See Memorandum from the Arizona Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Health
Care Provider/Hospital Reporting of Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault to Law
Enforcement (May 1997) (on file with author) (explaining the duties of a health care
provider in assisting victims of domestic violence or sexual assault).
56. Sandy Davenport, Address to the Domestic Violence Law Clinic,· James E. Rogers
College of Law, The University of Arizona (Mar. 22, 2001).
57. See Memorandum from the Arizona Coalition Against Domestic Violence, supra
note 55, at 1.
58. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 13-3601(B) (2003).

59. See id.
60. For an exceptional historical analysis of the lobbying for mandatory arrest policies by
the anti-domestic violence movement see generally Barbara Fedders, Lobbying for

Mandatory-Arrest Policies: Race, Class, and the Politics of the Battered Women's
Movement, 23 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 281 (1997).
61. See Tucson Police Department General Orders, 2 General Operating Procedures,
Arrest Policies No. 2100, § 2112.7 (May 2001) (on file with author).
62. See Governor's Task Force Against Domestic Violence, Domestic Violence in
Arizona Executive Summary Report and Recommendations 10 (Feb. 1988). See generally
Clegg & Associates, TucsonlPima County Domestic Violence System Design (Dec. 1995)
(on file with author).

10

HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 14:1

violence offenders into custody once arrested, as opposed to issuing a
citation and releasing the abuser from the scene. 63 Again, the law in this
regard is in line with national trends and is directly responsive to criticisms
raised by the anti-domestic violence movement that police officers were
not treating abusers as criminal actors when they were released from the
scene without citation or detention. 64
C. PROSECUTION
In the service area of the Clinic, domestic violence misdemeanor
prosecutions are handled by two separate prosecution agencies. 65
Generally, domestic violence prosecution policies can be divided into three
categories: 1) hard/no-drop policies where victims can be forced to testify
against their abusers; 2) pro-prosecution jurisdictions where victim
participation is encouraged and a case may proceed in her absence if the
evidence can support such action; and 3) soft pros€!cution policies that
provide a victim with supportive services to encourage her participation,
but ultimately yield to the victim's decision on whether or not to proceed. 66
Both prosecuting agencies in the Clinic service area an! committed to "proprosecution" policies with intermittent use of hard/no-drop practices. In
other words, when the evidence in a case of domestic violence supports the
likelihood of a conviction, prosecution of the offender will be sought
despite any request made by the victim that the case bf! dropped. At times,
individual prosecutors may seek to invoke the contempt power of the court
to compel or punish reluctant victims who fail to appear at trial to testify
against their abusers as required by subpoena.
D. SENTENCING

A criminal defendant entering the system on a misdemeanor domestic
violence assault charge as a first time offender could, in theory, be allowed
to compromise the case or participate in an approved diversion program. 67
63. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3601(1) (2003).
64. Fedders, supra note 60, at 287-90.
65. The Office of the Pima County Attorney is responsible for the prosecution of
misdemeanor crimes that occur within the county of Pima. The Office of the Tucson City
Attorney is responsible for the prosecution of misdemeanor offenses that occur within the
city limits of Tucson.
66. See Gena L. Durham, The Domestic Violence Dilemma: How Our Ineffective and
Varied Responses Reflect Our Conflicted Views of the Problem, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 641,
650-57 (1998). See generally Casey Gwinn & Anne O'Dell, Stopping the Violence: The
Role of the Police Officer and the Prosecutor, 20 W. ST. U. L. REv. 298, 308-11 (\ 993);
Cheryl Hanna, No Right To Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence
Prosecutions, \09 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1996).
67. The law concerning misdemeanor compromise in Arizona can be found at Arizona
Revised Statutes section 13-398\. Pursuant to subsection (B) of that code provision, "If a
defendant is accused of an act involving assault, threatening or intimidating or a
misdemeanor offense of domestic violence ... the offense shall not be compromised except
on recommendation of the prosecuting attorney." ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 13-3981(B) (2003)

Winter 2003]

THE IMMIGRANT VICTIMIDEFENDANT

II

Mandatory jail time is required for abusers who have been convicted of two
or more separate offenses of domestic violence within five years.68
Further, all persons convicted, either through trial or plea bargain, of an act
of domestic violence must complete a domestic violence offender treatment
program approved by the department of health services or a probation
department. 69 Both prosecuting agencies in Tucson have internal office
policies that strongly deter the use of the compromise process in domestic
violence cases. 70
The plea bargaining process in domestic violence cases, which includes
diversion, has received a mixed response from the advocate community.7!
Statewide, anti-domestic violence advocates made a recommendation
against the use of plea-bargaining and compromise in domestic violence
cases.72 However, Tucson advocates calIed for the encouragement of better
evidence collection efforts to encourage plea bargaining by offenders. 73
The difference in recommendations could be explained by the realization
among Tucson advocates, some eight years after the initial state-wide
recommendation, that the criminal justice system may not have been able
to effectively or efficiently conduct a trial for every misdemeanor domestic
violence case pursued by the prosecutor's office. 74 Therefore, the
(emphasis added). The statutory scheme regarding diversion in domestic violence cases is
found at Arizona Revised Statutes section 13-3601, subsection (M). The relevant portions
of that subsection read as follows:
Ifthe defendant is found guilty of an offense included in domestic violence
and if probation is otherwise available for that offense, the court may,
without entering a judgment of guilt and with the consent of the defendant,
defer further proceedings and place the defendant on probation or intensive
probation, as provided in this subsection.
Jd. § 13-3601(M).
68. See id. §13-3601.02.
69. See id. §13-3601.01.
70. A statement from the Tucson City Attomey's Office includes the following language:
"TYPES OF CASES THAT CANNOT BE DISMISSED PURSUANT TO A
MISDEMEANOR COMPROMISE: Assaults against police officers; Any case involving
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE or INDECENT EXPOSURE; Violations of Protective or
Harassment Orders; Custodial or Visitation Interference; and crimes in which the victim is a
child." Statement from the Tucson City Attorney's Office, Criminal Misdemeanor
Compromise Instructions (Dec. 1994) (on file with author) (emphasis in original). The
Office of the Pima County Attorney has a similar written policy regarding misdemeanor
compromise. Statement from the Office of the Pima County Attorney (on file with author).
That policy includes the following statement: "Misdemeanor compromise does not
automatically apply to assault or domestic violence cases. However, it may apply in some
of those cases. Prior approval of the prosecutor must be obtained before such will be
allowed." /d. (emphasis removed).
71. The practice of plea bargaining typically involves the defendant pleading guilty to
one or more offenses in exchange for the state dropping other charges and recommending a
lenient sentence.
72. See Governor's Task Force Against Domestic Violence. supra note 62, at 5.
73. See Clegg & Associates, supra note 62, at 56.
74. During fiscal year 1999-2000,47,000 criminal misdemeanor cases were processed by
the municipal court in Tucson. Hon. Margarita Bernal, Address at the Domestic Violence
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encouragement of plea bargaining may have been viewed as a way to
reduce the burden on an overloaded judicial system while simultaneously
resulting in criminal consequences and punishment for offenders.
The remaining sections of this article address the impact of the
mandatory domestic violence intervention policies on immigrant women.
In particular, the article addresses the impact of mandatory misdemeanor
prosecution policies on the battered immigrant victim in terms of
citizenship status, employment, and child custody. While many of the
consequences for battered immigrant women are suffered comparably by
non-immigrant women, the plight of immigrant women highlights some of
the difficulties inherent in enforcing mandatory policies in a manner that is
responsive to community needs of safety and stability. The article does not
attempt to address the question of whether intervention is necessary or
required by the state as an initial step toward combating domestic. violence.
Rather, it assumes that some degree of state intervention will occur once
the violence in the home is publicly disclosed.

VI. BATTERED IMMIGRANT WOMEN'S RESPONSES TO
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
A composite picture can be developed to illustrate some of the
common responses to domestic violence by batter~:d immigrant Latinas
based on the collective experience of myself, other clinical faculty
members, staff, and students. 75
The most common responses of battered immigrant women to domestic
violence fall into five areas: I) calling a relative or friend to report abuse by
intimate partners; 2) leaving the home for a brief period; 3) remaining in
the home and attempting to pacify the abuser; 4) using methods of selfdefense against the abuser; and 5) communicating with law enforcement
after officers have been called to the scene by the abuser or another party.
The composite responses, based on experiences in the Clinic, are in line
with research studies performed in this area. 76 Additionally, Clinic clients
generally report that they have never or rarely sought the assistance of law
enforcement or other state institutions due to fear of being reported to the

Law Seminar, James E. Rogers College of Law, The University of Arizona (Nov. 5, 2002).
Additionally, the municipal court is responsible for handling civil traffic cases, parking
tickets, civil ordinance violations, certain DUI cases, and civil domestic violence orders of
protection (5,600 processed during reporting period). id.
75. During the period between 1999 and 2001 the Clinic sch,~duled initial client intake
appointments with an average of 428 clients per year. An examination of 331 cases during
that time period revealed that 163 clients reported not having United States Citizenship
status when they sought assistance from the Clinic. Further, of those 163 clients, 122
reported that Spanish was their first language.
76. Mary Ann Dutton et ai., Characteristics of Help-Seeking Behaviors, Resources and
Service Needs of Battered immigrant Latinas: Legal and Policy implications, 7 OEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL'y 245,248 (2000).
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Immigration Naturalization Service (INS). The concerns expressed by
immigrant women in this regard are completely justified given the severity
of harms that can result from interaction with the criminal justice system. 17
Another common experience shared by Clinic clients is that their arrest
for an act of domestic violence was precipitated by an act of violence
against them by their intimate partner and the partner's contacting law
enforcement in an attempt to carry out threats to have the immigrant
woman deported. The threat to have a woman deported is recognized as a
particular form of domestic violence deployed by abusive United States
citizen and legal permanent resident spouses against their immigrant
spouses. 78
And so, we return to Rosa. The coercive control tactics exercised by
Francisco with regard to her citizenship are in full cycle. He promises to
file, but he does not. She asks for her papers; he refuses. She leaves with
the children to stay with her in-laws; he promises her that he will file the
requisite papers. She returns. Rosa takes work outside the home as a
childcare worker at a local daycare center to supplement the increasingly
limited family income and begins to learn a small amount of English.
Francisco's control is waning and he grows angrier at each argument and
threatens physical harm.
He accuses Rosa of adultery and other
transgressions. Now he no longer threatens physical violence; he uses it
against her. Rosa experiences open-handed slaps to the face, pushing and
shoving, and sexual contact against her consent committed against her by
Francisco. She does not seek outside assistance for the harms. Francisco
tells Rosa to conform to his demands or risk further harm, deportation, and
loss of custody of their American-born children. During a particularly
intense episode, Francisco attempts to block the exit to the home as Rosa
tries to leave with the children, carrying the youngest in her arms. In
response, Rosa yells at Francisco, demanding that he let her leave the
home. She pushes him away from the door and scratches him in the face.
When the monolingual English-speaking police finally arrive they find
Rosa afraid and unable to communicate effectively with them. Francisco, a
fluent English speaker, is able to tell his story to the police with clarity and
conviction.

VII. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
A

ARREST AND PROSECUTION OF ROSA

The combined· effect of mandatory arrest and prosecution policies
77. For an exceptional analysis of the collision between domestic violence policies and
immigration law, see generally Espenoza, supra note 4.
78. See Dutton et aI., supra note 76, at 250-53. For an appellate court decision detailing
this particular form of abuse, see Vega-Zazuetav. INS, No. 95-70856, 1997 U.S. App.
LEXIS 17439, at*2 (9thCir. July 10, 1997).

14

HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 14:1

results in the filing of criminal charges against Rosa. She is charged with
misdemeanor assault, disorderly conduct, and contributing to the
delinquency and dependency of a minor. 79
Perhaps better, culturally-appropriate training would have prevented
the arrest of Rosa. However, Rosa's arrest, detention" and prosecution will
serve to. add credibility to Francisco's threats of deportation and loss of
child custody.
In Tucson, persons in Rosa's position as defendants accused of
misdemeanor domestic violence are typically not afforded legal
gO
representation through the public defender's office.
Accordingly, it is
safe to assume that Rosa will not be aware of th~: myriad of negative
consequences that can result from her prosecution. Additionally, given the
mandatory prosecution policies in place, any efforts made by Francisco to
prevent the prosecution of Rosa, albeit not entirely for benevolent reasons,
will not be effective. In fact, Francisco may be subject to criminal
punishment himself if he fails to testify against Rosa at trial. In order to
terminate her involvement in the criminal justice system, Rosa will either
have to accept a plea offer, including diversion, or seek a trial. 8 !
Therefore, despite the fact that mandatory laws and policies were put
into place to aid victims of domestic violence, they can prove to be a rigid
trap for women unable to successfully navigate the system. An argument
can be made that Rosa's actions did, in fact, constitute assault and not an
act of self-defense. However, no serious doubt can exist about the fact that
Rosa is a victim of domestic violence at the hands of Francisco. She is a

79. Arizona Revised Statutes section 13-1203 provides:
A. A person commits assault by:
1. Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing any physical injury
to another person; or
2. Intentionally placing another person in reasonable apprehension
of imminent physical injury; or
3. knowingly touching another person with thl~ intent to injure,
insult or provoke such person.
B. Assault committed intentionally or knowingly pursuant to subsection A,
paragraph 1 is a class 1 misdemeanor. Assault committed recklessly
pursuant to subsection A, paragraph 2 is a class 2 misdemeanor. Assault
committed pursuant to subsection A, paragraph 3 is a class 3 misdemeanor.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1203 (2003).
80. Jeff Klotz, Address at the Domestic Violence Law Clinic, James E. Rogers College of
Law, The University of Arizona (Feb. 8, 2000). Jeff Klotz is an attorney at the Tucson
Public Defender's Office.
81. Diversion in domestic violence cases is specifically provided for under Arizona
Revised Statutes section 13-3601, subsection (M). ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 13-3601(M) (2003).
The primary difference between diversion and the plea bargain is that under diversion,
successful completion of the tenns of probation prevents the entry of a finding of guilt
against the defendant and the case is dismissed. With respect to trial, defendants charged
with misdemeanor domestic violence offenses are not entitled to a jury trial. See State ex
rei. McDougal v. Strohson, 945 P.2d 1251, 1258 (Ariz. 1997) (holding that under Arizona
law an offender is not entitled to a jury trial for a misdemeanor as~:ault charge).
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victimldefendant 82
Yet, assuming that her actions were unlawful,
mandatory prosecution policies that provide a one-size-fits-all solution for
all offenders will not result in the reduction of domestic violence tactics
used by Francisco against Rosa. Instead, it is likely that Rosa will be
deterred from seeking assistance from the state in any future domestic
violence circumstance. Even more disturbing, Francisco has no incentive
to alter his behavior. In fact, mandatory policies that do not allow for
prosecutorial discretion in these types of cases result in the state's
unwitting enhancement of an abuser's ability to exert control over his
victim.

B.

THE AVAILABILITY OFV A WA RELIEF FOR ROSA

Any final case disposition short of total acquittal or dismissal of the
criminal charges against Rosa may result in grave immigration
consequences. In Rosa's case, Francisco did eventually file a spouse
application form with the local INS office and Rosa was granted
conditional residency to remain in the country. She was also granted
employment authorization allowing her legally obtain employment. s3
However, Rosa, as a victim of domestic violence married to a United
States citizen, may be eligible to file her own request for citizenship with
the INS based on revisions to the immigration law enacted pursuant to the
Violence Against Women Act of 1994.84 The sweeping legislation
wrestled control over the acquisition of legal citizenship status away from
the abuser and placed power squarely in the hands of the victim. Like
mandatory intervention laws and policies, the changes to immigration laws
providing protections to victims of domestic violence is the type of legal
response for which anti-domestic violence advocates lobbied for years. 85
A successful VA WA petition with the INS requires the victim to prove
three essential elements: 1) good faith marriage to U.S. citizen or legal
permanent resident; 2) battery or extreme cruelty; and 3) good moral
character. 86 Once a VA WA application is approved, the applicant may be
granted employment authorization and will be allowed to remain in the
82. The tenn "victim/defendant" will be used throughout the remainder of this article to
describe victims of domestic violence who find themselves as defendants in criminal court
facing charges of domestic violence wherein their abuser is the state's victim. The tenn has
been used by other authors to describe a similar set of circumstances. See Cecelia M.
Espenoza, Crimes of Violence by Non-Citizens and the Immigration Consequences, COLO.
LAW., Oct. 1997, at 89-90.
83. For a detailed discussion of the process by which a United States citizen spouse can
petition for citizenship status on behalf of his immigrant spouse, see Espenoza, supra note 4,
at 213-14.
84. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 204(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a) (1998) [hereinafter
INA]. The revisions allow an alien spouse to file her own request for citizenship if she can
demonstrate to the Attorney General that she has been battered.. Id.
85. See Rivera, supra note 3, at 464.
86. See Espenoza, supra note 4, at 167-69, 172-73.
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country until filing the necessary documents with the INS to adjust her
status to legal permanent resident (LPR). In order to achieve the coveted
LPR status, Rosa will have to prove to the INS that she is not otherwise
"inadmissible." 87
If Rosa accepts a diversion plea offer, a standard plea offer, or if she is
convicted of the domestic violence charge, she then faces two potential
hurdles with the IN'S in her application for citizenship. First, she will likely
be unable to prove to the INS that she is of "good moral character," a
necessary element in the first stage of a successful VAWA application.
Second, she may be found inadmissible by the INS and thereby unable to
achieve LPR status.
1. VAWA Application Requirements: Good Moral Character and
Aggravated Felony Convictions
Rosa will have to show that she has good moral character in order for
the INS to approve her VAWA petition. The domestic violence assault
charges will effect this determination. Good moral character is not
specifically defined under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), but
the Act lists offenses, conduct, and behavior that can prevent an applicant
from being found to have good moral character. 88 In Rosa's case, it can be
argued that if she receives a sentence of confinement for more than one
year she cannot be found to have good moral character because she has
been convicted of an aggravated felony, despite the charge as a statedefined misdemeanor. The result is the same if she accepts diversion or a
standard plea offer or if she is found guilty at trial. The only way that she
can be certain to prevent such a finding is by being acquitted after trial or
otherwise having the case dismissed by the state.
The basis for such a harsh result is found in the definitions of
"conviction" and "aggravated felony." Under the INA, a conviction can
include an admission to acts that constitute the essential elements of a
crime, coupled with some restriction on one's liberty.89 Participation in a
domestic violence diversion program will require Rosa to accept
responsibility for the domestic violence assault, waive her right to trial, and
subject herself to probation, eventually leading to dismissal of the
87. See INA § 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1 182(a)(2) (1998).
88. See INA § IDl(t), 8 U.S.C. § IIDI(t) (1998).
89. INA § 10 1(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. § lIDl(a)(48)(A) (1998).
The tenn "conviction" means, with respect to an alien, a fonnal judgment of
guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been
withheld, where-(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered
a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to
warrant a finding of guilt, and
(ii) the judge has ordered some fonn of punishment, penalty, or
restraint on the alien's liberty to be imposed.
!d.
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charges. 9o However, her participation in the diversion program will be
deemed a conviction by theINS. 91 Further, accepting responsibility for the
assault pursuant to a standard plea offer by the state, where Rosa would be
found guilty of the crime and a conviction entered in return for a lesser
sentence of punishment or probationary terms, would be considered a
conviction under immigration law. Finally, the uncertainty of an outcome
at trial given the fact that Rosa cannot be assured an acquittal renders the
decision to pursue a trial a disconcerting alternative. However, a trial is the
best chance Rosa has of obtaining a result that will not be deemed a
conviction pursuant to immigration laws.
Particularly problematic is the domestic violence assault charge. A
state misdemeanor assault may fit the definition of an aggravated felony
under federallaw. 92 The INA states that an aggravated felony includes a
crime of violence for which the sentence imposed is at least one year of
confinement. 93 The term "crime of violence," in tum, is defined to include
the use of physical force against another person. 94 It can be argued that the
definition of assault in Arizona includes the use of force against another
person. 95 Thus, if Rosa is convicted of assault and sentenced to a term of
imprisonment for at least one year, even if the sentence is suspended, she is
barred from establishing good moral character for VA WA purposes. The
saving grace for Rosa in this scenario may be the fact that under Arizona
law, the maximum term of imprisonment for a class one misdemeanor is
six months. 96
Additionally, changes to the INA as a result of YAW A II now allow
the Attorney General to find that an applicant has good moral character
despite a criminal conviction if it is determined that the conviction is
connected to the applicant having been battered or subject to extreme
cruelty.97

90. ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 13-3601(M) (2003).
91. See INA § 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (1998).
92. See INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (1998).
93. See INA § 101(a)(43)(F),8 U.S.C. § 110 1(a)(43)(F) (1998). Also, under Arizona
law, a person convicted of a class one misdemeanor can receive punishment of up to three
years of court monitored probation. See ARIz. REv. STAT. § 13-902 (2003).
94. 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2003).
A crime of violence means-(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person or property
of another, or
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature,
involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person
or property of another may be used in the course of committing
the offense.
Jd.
95. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1203(A)(1) (2003).
96. Jd. § 13-707 (A)(1).
97. INA § 204(a)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(C) (1998).
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2. Inadmissibility for Crimes of Moral Turpitude
If we assume that Rosa had been able to file a VAW A application with
the INS that was approved prior to her arrest and prosecution, then she may
still face great difficulty in attempting to adjust her status to LPR. The
reason for the difficulty is the requirement that persons seeking LPR status
must prove that they are not inadmissible based on a conviction for a crime
of moral turpitude. 98 The essential question in determining whether a crime
involves moral turpitude is whether the proscribed· act, as defined by the
law of the appropriate jurisdiction in which the act was committed,
includes elements which necessarily demonstrate the baseness, vileness,
and depravity of the perpetrator.99 Rosa was charged with three separate
crimes - assault, disorderly conduct, and contributing to the delinquency of
a minor. An individual assessment of each charge is required.
In Arizona, the analysis of whether a crime is one of moral turpitude
has been most commonly addressed on appeal when a defendant has been
denied a jury trial for a misdemeanor offense. 100
With respect to the assault charge, it is unlikely that a conviction for a
class one misdemeanor assault, designated domestic violence, will qualify
as a crime of moral turpitude under the INA. 101 The Supreme Court of
Arizona has found that an assault is not a crime of moral turpitude in its
analysis of whether a defendant convicted of domestic violence assault was
entitled to a jury triaL 102
Second, the Supreme Court of Arizona has reached the conclusion that
disorderly conduct is not a crime involving moral turpitude in today's
modern culture. 103 Therefore, even if Rosa is found guilty of committing
the crime of disorderly conduct and it is designated as a domestic violence
offense, she should not be found inadmissible on the basis of a conviction
for a crime of moral turpitude.
Finally, Rosa has been charged with contributing to delinquency and
dependency of a minor. The statute provides that a person who acts,
causes, encourages or contributes to the delinquency or dependency of a
child under the age of eighteen years can be found guilty of a class one

98. INA § 212(a)(2){A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A) (1998).
99. 3B AM. JUR. 2D Aliens and Citizens § 1829 (2002).
100. See, e.g., State ex rei. McDougal v. Stohson, 945 P.2d 1251 (Ariz. 1997); State ex rei.
Baumert v. Superior Court, 618 P.2d 1078 (Ariz. 1990); Bazzanella v. Tucson City Court,
988 P.2d 157 (Ariz. App. 1999).
101. Simple assault crimes are generally not considered crimes of moral turpitude. See 3B
AM. JUR. 2D Aliens and Citizens § 1830 (2002).
102. See State ex rei. McDougal, 945 P.2d at 1255. The case involved a designated
domestic violence assault wherein the defendant sought a jury trial because a conviction for
the crime would have prohibited the defendant from possessing lirearms. !d. at 1252. The
request was denied because the offense was not one involving moral turpitude. Jd. at 1258.
103. See State ex rei. Baumert, 618 P.2d at 1080.
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misdemeanor. l04 Delinquency is defined as "any act which tends to debase
or injure the morals, health or welfare of a child.,,105 The definition of a
dependent person includes a child "whose home, by reason of neglect,
cruelty or depravity of his parents, or either of them, or on the part of his
guardian, or on the part of the person in whose custody or care he may be,
is an unfit place for such person.,,106 In Tucson, victim/defendants similar
to Rosa have been charged with contributory dependency or contributory
delinquency where the alleged facts assert that a child was present in the
home and witnessed the domestic violence incident. l07 In Rosa's case, the
fact that she was holding her child in her anns when she scratched
Francisco could serve as the basis for the charge. Remarkably, the Arizona
Supreme Court has found that misdemeanor child abuse is not a crime of
moral turpitude. 108
3. RemovallDeportation for Crimes of Domestic Violence
For the purposes of this section, assume that Rosa had been able to
achieve LPR status. She nonetheless will be at risk of removal from the
country by the INS if she is convicted of a "crime of domestic violence.,,109
The inclusion of domestic violence as a grounds for removal/deportation
was added to the INA by the Illegal Immigration Refonn and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996. 110 It is significant to note that the provision
was not enacted as part of the anti-domestic violence advocate sponsored
VA W A I or V A WA II legislation.
A "crime of domestic violence" under the INA is a crime of violence
committed against a person that stands in a specifically defined relationship
to the offender. I II The spousal relationship between Rosa and Francisco
qualifies as a type of relationship covered by the INA provision. A crime
of violence is not specifically defined in the INA. Instead, the INA makes
specific reference to the federal criminal code for the definition of a crime
of violence. 112 The federal definition of a crime of violence includes "an
offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
104. ARIZ. REv. STAT. §§ 13-3612 to 13-3613 (2003).
105. Jd. § 13-3612(1).
106. Jd. § 13-36l2(3)(g).
107. Jd. § 13-3613(C).
108. See Bazzanella v. Tucson City Court, 988 P.2d 157, 160 (Ariz. App. 1999). The
defendant in the case sought a jury trial on the charges of misdemeanor child abuse because
a conviction would jeopardize her employment and carry other collateral consequences. Jd.
The court denied the defendant's request. Jd. at 161. The court found that misdemeanor
child abuse is not an act of moral turpitude because the act involved a simple failure to
perceive and act reasonably under the circumstances and did not involve a serious risk of
physical injury to the child. ld.
109. INA § 237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.c. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (1998).
110. See llIegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, § 350, 110 Stat. 279 (1996).
Ill. INA § 237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (1998).
112. Jd.
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physical force against the person or property of anothe:r.,,113 The class one
misdemeanor assault charge faced by Rosa qualifies as a crime of violence
because an argument can be made that the use of physical force is a
necessary element of the offense. I 14
Turning next to the crime of disorderly conduct, it is less likely that a
conviction for this offense will render Rosa deportable. The reason for the
outcome can be found in the definition of disorderly conduct which does
not require the use of physical force as an element. 115 The result will tum
on whether Rosa is found guilty of the crime by engaging in fighting.116
Again, it can be argued that the act of fighting with another person requires
the use of physical force rendering it a crime of violence.
Finally, Rosa could be found deportable based on a conviction for a
crime of child abuse.117 The crime of contributory dependency or
contributory delinquency is designated a family offense in Arizona along
with other similar crimes; including child abuse.118 It may be argued that a
conviction for contributory dependency or delinquency falls within the
child abuse grounds for deportability under the INA.
Ultimately, given the above analysis, if Rosa participates in diversion,
accepts a standard plea bargain, or is found guilty at trial on any of the
charges, she will most likely be found deportable by the INS. Fortunately,

113. See 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2003).
114. Lynn Marcus, Director of the Immigration Law Clinic, James E. Rogers College of
Law, The University of Arizona, informed the author that in her practice she has found that
Tucson immigration judges do perceive a conviction for a class 1 misdemeanor assault as a
grounds for removal/deportation under the INA (October, 2002).
liS. Arizona's statute regarding disorderly conduct provides:
A. A person commits disorderly conduct if, with intent to disturb the peace
or quiet of a neighborhood, family or person, or with knowledge of doing so,
such person:
1. Engages in fighting, violent or seriously disruptive behavior; or
2. Makes unreasonable noise; or
3. Uses abusive or offensive language or gestures to any person
present in a manner likely to provoke immediate physical retaliation
by such person; or
4. Makes any protracted commotion, utterance or display with the
intent to prevent the transaction of the business of a lawful meeting,
gathering or procession; or
5. Refuses to obey a lawful order to disperse issued to maintain
public safety in dangerous proximity to a fire, a hazard or any other
emergency; or
6. Recklessly handles, displays or discharges a deadly weapon or
dangerous instrument.
B. Disorderly conduct under subsection A, paragraph 6 is a class 6 felony.
Disorderly conduct under subsection A, paragraph 1,2,3,4 or 5 is a class I
misdemeanor.
ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 13-2904 (2003).
116. Id. § 13-2904(A)(l).
117. INA § 237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (1998).
118. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. §§ 13-3601 to 13-3625 (2003).
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legislation enacted pursuant to VA WAIl may provide relief for Rosa
should she find herself in deportation proceedings. I 19 However, it would be
a poor legal strategy to advise Rosa to participate in diversion or accept a
standard plea bargain to the charges and then seek at best uncertain relief
from deportation.
C.

CHILD CUSTODY IMPLICATIONS

Once Rosa navigates her way out of the criminal justice system with
any result short of acquittal or dismissal of the charges, she then faces the
imposition of mandatory policies in place in domestic relations law should
Francisco challenge her for custody of their two children. 120 Under
Arizona law, there exists a presumption against awarding custody to
domestic violence offenders. 121 The domestic violence offender can rebut
the presumption at a hearing on the merits. The presumption does not
apply if the court finds that both parents have committed an act of domestic
violence. 122 However, Rosa would be at a disadvantage if she has a
conviction for domestic violence as compared to no record of conviction
against Francisco. Rosa will have to show that she has proof of

119. INA section 237(a)(7) provides:
Waiver for victims of domestic violence
(A) In general
The Attorney General is not limited by the criminal court record and may
waive the application of paragraph (2)(E)(i) (with respect to crimes of
domestic violence and crimes of stalking) and (ii) in the case of an alien who
has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty and who is not and was not
the primary perpetrator of violence in the relationship--(i) upon a determination that(I) the alien was acting in self-defense;
(\l) the alien was found to have violated a protection order
intended to protect the alien; or
(Ill) the alien committed, was arrested for, was convicted of,
or pled guilty to committing a crime(aa) that did not result in serious bodily injury; and
(bb) where there was a connection between the crime
and the alien's having been battered or subjected to
extreme cruelty.
(B) Credible evidence considered
In acting on applications under this paragraph, the Attorney General shall
consider any credible evidence relevant to the application.
The
determination of what evidence is credible and the weight to be given that
evidence shall be within the sole discretion of the Attorney General.
INA § 237(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(7) (l998) (footnote omitted).
120. Fathers who batter mothers are two times more likely to seek sole physical custody of
their children than are non-violent fathers. See American Bar Association Commission on
Domestic Violence, Prevalence, at http://www.abanet.orgJdomviollstats.html(last visited
May 1,2003) (citing American Psychological Association, Violence and the Family: Report
of the American Psychological Association Presidential Tasliforce on .violence and the
Family, 40 (1996».
121. ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 25-403(N) (2003).
122. ld.
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rehabilitation (Le. completion of the domestic violence offender treatment
program) to rebut the presumption against her receiving custody of the
children. 123 Additionally, she will have to testify regarding the past acts of
domestic violence that Francisco has committed against her. The net result
may be the refusal of the court to impose the presumption against either
party. However, Rosa will remain at a disadvantage compared to Francisco
who has greater access to resources (e.g., citizenship, employment, family
support, housing). It is inconceivable that the same advocates who sought
the imposition of mandatory prosecution of domestic violence offenders
contemplated the complicated web of harmful consequences in which
Rosa, the victim/defendant, has been ensnared.
D. ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE.

One of the factors that can prevent some women from leaving an
abusive relationship is the inability to support themselves and their children
independent of the abuser.124 Thus, the ability of domestic violence victims
to obtain employment outside of the home is critical in the fight against
abuse. However, here too we find unintended consequences for Rosa
resulting from her mandatory prosecution on the domestic violence
charges. Recall that Rosa had found a job as a childcare worker. It is not
uncommon for women similarly situated to Rosa in Southern Arizona to
find employment in this field. 125
Rosa will lose her position as a childcare worker as a result of the
mandatory arrest and prosecution. The result is dictated by the regulatory
scheme that requires childcare workers to obtain a valid fingerprint
clearance card through the state Department of Public Safety.126 The law
requires that child .care personnel submit two items to their employer: 1) a
certification form; and 2) a valid class one or class two fingerprint
clearance card. 127 The fact that Rosa has been arrested and is awaiting trial
for the charge of contributing to the delinquency or dependency of a minor,
which is a charge of child abuse,128 will preclude Rosa from being issued a
class one or class two fingerprint clearance card by the Department of
Public Safety.129 The child abuse charge will also prevent Rosa from being
able to submit the certification form which requires her to certify that she is

123. Id. § 25-403(0).
124. See Dutton et aI., supra note 76, at 269-71.
125. See generally INSTITUTE FOR WOMEN'S POLICY RESEARCH, THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN
ARIZONA: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, HEALTH, DEMOGRAPHICS (2000).
126. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 36-883.02(A), 41-1758.03 (2003).
127. Id. § 36-883.02(A).
128. The term "dependency" as defined under section 13-3612, the statute under which
Rosa has been charged, mirrors the definition of "dependent chlld" pursuant to the statc
juvenile court and child abuse provisions. ARIZ. REv. STAT. §§ 8-201(13), 13-36l2(3)(g)
(2003).
129. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1758.03(8)(14), (F)(8) (2003).
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not awaiting trial on child abuse charges. 130
Even if contributing to the delinquency and dependency of a minor was
not a crime of child abuse, the charge of assault and the domestic violence
designation of all of the offenses would preclude Rosa from obtaining the
requisite fingerprint clearance unless she can prove a good cause
exception. 131 A good cause exception can include consideration of any
mitigating circumstances. 132 In theory, Rosa could ask for a good cause
hearing before the board and present evidence of the prior abuse by her
husband and her actions of self-defense in an effort to prove mitigation. 133
However, Rosa has no financial ability to hire legal counsel to represent
her before the board. She has limited education, training, and English
language proficiency. It is difficult to imagine how she would be able to
successfully obtain a good cause exception for the issuance of a class one
or two fingerprint clearance card.

VIII. VAW A DIVERSION AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Rather than a wholesale elimination of all mandatory policies and laws
outlined in this article, I propose the implementation of discretionary
prosecution under select circumstances as warranted by identified case
facts. The approach necessarily requires a level of trust by and between
criminal justice system actors, anti-domestic violence advocates, and
members of historically oppressed groups that has heretofore been
unrealized. The alternative leaves victims like Rosa in the cross hairs of
intersecting policies enacted to address domestic violence as a serious
public concern without regard to the consequences that leave devastated
victims their their wake. I argue for the imposition of this discretionary
model for immigrant victims of domestic violence who are also facing
charges of misdemeanor domestic violence. The proposal attempts to
address two concerns: 1) that victims of domestic violence are identified as
early as possible by the prosecutor's office, even when the victims enter the
system as defendants; and 2) that victimldefend~mts in domestic violence
cases progress through the criminal justice system in a manner that renders
them more capable of ending the violence in their lives rather than keeping
them trapped in a cycle of violence.
A. INDIVIDUALIZED CASE ASSESSMENT By PROSECUTORIAL STAFF
SPECIFICALLY TRAINED IN IDENTIFICATION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
VICTIMS

To the extent that agreement exists between advocates and state actors
that domestic violence is a crime requiring particular attention, resources
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.

§ 36-883.02(C)(1).
§ 41-1758.03(C)(4), (C)(59), (G)(IO), (G)(l2).
§ 41-619.55(D)(4).
§ 41-619.55(B).
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should be devoted to specially train prosecutors to identify and recognize
the particular forms of coercive control that abusive spouses use against
immigrant victims of domestic violence. J34 Early identification of these
cases will allow for the provision of appropriate case disposition
alternatives that do not yield the unintended consequences discussed above,.
B. VAW A DIVERSION AND OTHER CASE DISPOSITION OPTIONS FOR
VICTIMIDEFENDANTS IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES

Once identified, prosecutors should be given discretion to offer an
array of case disposition alternatives that will allow the victim/defendant to
address the violence in her life in a safe and responsible manner, but do not
render her deported, childless, and unemployed. An alternative that has
proved successful in the Clinic service area is commonly referred to as
VA WA diversion. 135 The VA WA diversion alternative is really a
misnomer because the victim/defendant is not required to admit facts
sufficient to sustain a conviction for a domestic violence offense. Instead,
the case is held open in the pre-trial phase while the victim/defendant
completes counseling. The number of hours of counseling required is
determined by the prosecutor, and the counseling must be obtained through
a program that is appropriate for the needs of a victim of domestic
violence. After the requisite number of counseling hours have been
completed, the case is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecutor 'and the
victim/defendant is allowed to exit the system without a c,onviction or the
resulting negative immigration law consequences. Any concerns about
repeat offenders can be relieved by the official recognition of the VAWA
diversion as a legitimate case disposition. Accordingly, the prosecutor's
office may want to implement a policy that a defendant may only
participate in one VA WA diversion program in her lifi~time.
Other options such as creative plea bargaining should be explored.
Creative approaches to plea bargaining may include carefully drafted plea
agreements that reduce the charge to a non-domestic violence offense and a
non-violent offense with a maximum term of probation that does not
exceed one year.
In Rosa's case, a reduction of the assault charge to a class three
misdemeanor would provide greater assurance against deportation on the
grounds of conviction for a crime of violence. 136 Similarly, basing the
disorderly conduct charge on something other than fighting (i.e.,

134. Advocates may argue that it is inappropriate and not legally required that prosecutors
inquire into the citizenship status of defendants. However, by the time the case is assessed
by the prosecutor's office, the citizenship status of the defendant would likely have been
discovered through processing at the municipal detention center or county jail.
135. See discussion at supra note 9.
136. A class three misdemeanor assault in Arizona does not require the use of force as a
necessary element of the offense. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1203(A)(3) (2003).
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unreasonable noise) could aid in preventing deportationY7 Accordingly,
an attractive prosecution offer for Rosa might include an outright dismissal
of the contributing to the delinquency or dependency of a minor charge and
a plea of guilty to the reduced charges of assault and disorderly conduct. 138
C. REFERRAL TO IMMIGRATION LEGAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AND
ApPOINTMENT OF PUBLIC DEFENSE COUNSEL

Immigrant victim/defendants involved in domestic violence cases
should be provided with referrals to immigration legal assistance programs
so that appropriate remedies may be sought under the VA WA provisions of
the INA 139
Further, resources must be made available so that
victim/defendants can be afforded representation through the public
defender's office as the case outcome can have a substantial impact on their
immigration status and rights in this country.
D.

REFERRAL TO CULTURALLY-SPECIFIC ADVOCACY AND COUNSELING
SERVICES

Immigrant victim/defendants should be identified early and referred
immediately : to culturally-sensitive, anti-domestic violence advocacy
service providers. These agencies can provide counseling and other
supportive services in a manner that recognizes the mUltiple identities of
race, gender, and national origin of victim/defendants like Rosa. 140
E.

COMMUNITY EDUCATION AND "ROSA'S RIGHTS"

The above-suggested proposals contemplate action after the initiation
of a prosecution. However, community education could lessen the
potential for cases similar to Rosa's from being referred for prosecution in
the first instance. Agencies providing services to, recently immigrated
women are in a unique position to educate potential victim/defendants
about their rights. In Tucson, social service providers routinely hand out a
card, in English and Spanish, which lists community resources available to
victims of domestic violence. A similar card can be created and distributed
137. See id § 13-2904(A)(2). A disorderly conduct charge can be based on acts which do
not require force as a necessary element of the offense. ld. See also supra note \ 15. ,
138. It is the position of this author that although greater disposition alternatives should be
available;participation in a diversion program or acceptance of a plea bargain should not be
recommended when the defendant has a strong and credible defense and is likely to prevail
at trial (i.e. self defense).
139. In the Clinic service area, Southern Arizona Legal Aid, Inc. (SALA) provides legal
assistance to victims of domestic violence that are eligible to file a self-petition for
citizenship under the VAWA and VAWA II meehanisms. It is common for SALA to refer
their V AWA clients to the Clinic for criminal defense representation prior to filing the selfpetition.
140. See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality. Identity
Politics. and Violence Against Women oJColor, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241 (1991); M. Joan
McDermott, On Moral Enterprises. Pragmatism. and Feminist Criminology, 48 CRIME &
DELINQ. 283 (2002).
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to the same population of victims informing them of their rights upon state
intervention in a case of domestic violence. The rights, "Rosa's Rights,"
should include: 1) the right to request a language interpreter at the scene; 2)
the right to assert self-defense; 3) the right to report prior abuse; 4) the right
to request medical attention; and 5) the right to request documentation of
injuries.

IX. CONCLUSION
Overall, both anti-domestic violence advocates and state actors are
seeking a reduction in the incidence of domestic violence in the
community.
However, prosecuting agencies require additional and
ongoing training by advocates on the particular concerns facing immigrant
victims of domestic violence who may become criminal defendants in
misdemeanor court. Further, advocates need to trust that the exercise of
discretion by prosecutors in offering disposition alternatives will not
diminish progress made in getting state actors to treat domestic violence as
a serious criminal offense.

